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Abstract
Penetration testing (PT) is a well-established proactive approach to evaluating the
security of digital assets by actively identifying and exploiting existing vulnerabilities.
It is a widely used approach to improving the information security level of the target
system. However, the use of PT has been restricted to advanced security experts
who have many years of experience. Furthermore, the complex manual process is
costly and time-consuming.
Automation can significantly reduce the time, cost and human labour required
in the stage of information gathering, analysis and exploitation. In terms of privacy
protection, automated PT can prevent the leakage of sensitive information by human
testers.
To date, there has been little academic research on automated PT, and the field
is still in its infancy in security. Many studies or implementations of automation
merely map the results of vulnerability scanners to the corresponding exploitation
tools. Most research treats PT as a planning problem expressed in terms of an
attack tree, an attack graph, a planning domain definition language (PDDL) or
a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). However, these solutions
either cannot handle incomplete knowledge, uncertainty and a dynamic environment,
or they exhibit poor scaling.
The contribution of the thesis is to achieve real-time automation of PT based on
the belief-desire-intention (BDI) model, and to validate the model, which can work
well in the Internet of Things (IoT) environment. An ontology for PT was built
based on semantic web rule language (SWRL) rules for knowledge reuse and better
reasoning ability. The experiment results illustrate that the model’s performance is
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better than the manual PT and other existing approaches.
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1.1 What is Penetration Testing?
In recent years, malicious network attacks have become an increasingly severe threat
to individuals, businesses and even national information security [91]. Penetration
testing (PT) [22] is a well-established proactive approach to evaluating the security
of digital assets by actively identifying and exploiting existing vulnerabilities. The
practice simulates real attacks carried out by hackers while not affecting the avail-
ability of target systems. In other words, PT aims to improve system security rather
than destroy or access information illegally. It gives administrators of the target
system a very intuitive understanding of the current system security problems.
On the one hand, PT can check whether the security protection measures of the
system are working effectively or not from the perspective of the attacker. On the
other hand, potential security risks can be highlighted in real events, thus improving
the level of awareness of relevant personnel on security issues. The main difference
between a hacker and a penetration tester is that PT is carried out after a contract
has been signed with an organisation or company, and it provides a report. After
the PT is completed, security issues found are immediately fixed, thereby effectively
preventing real security incidents. It should be noted that there is an essential
difference between PT (which is intended to exploit vulnerabilities for unauthorised
1
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access) and vulnerability assessment (which aims to identify and mitigate existing
vulnerabilities) [91].
In the 1970s, the U.S. military used PT to discover potential unknown vulnerabil-
ities. A group of professional information security experts (Red Team), was tasked
to attack the defence (Blue Team), thereby checking and improving the information
security level in a practical way. In the 1990s, PT began to expand from military to
industry. Currently, it is widely agreed that PT is one of the most effective methods
to improve the information security level of a target system. An increasing number
of companies and organisations has begun to use this method to ensure that any
potential vulnerabilities in their system are found and repaired before being exposed
[62].
1.2 Manual VS Automated
A growing number of enterprises is implementing security measures due to the in-
creased sophistication of cyberattacks. Total spending on cybersecurity by the year
2021 is USD 1 trillion [72]. The global PT market size is expected to grow from
USD 1.7 billion in 2020 to USD 4.5 billion by 2025 [62]. Figure 1.1 shows the PT
marketing by region from 2018 to 2025. However, the information security industry
will experience a workforce shortage of 3.5 million individuals by 2021 [73].
PT is a complex, expensive and time-consuming task. Moreover, the test results
are highly dependent on the skill and experience of a penetration tester or team. To
enhance efficiency, automated PT methods and tools are needed. Automation can
significantly reduce the time, cost and human involvement in the process of infor-
mation gathering, analysis and exploitation. Table 1.1 summarises the comparison
between manual and automated PT.
There are four different levels to describe the degree of automated PT [33]:
• Fully autonomous (level 4): The system is fully autonomous in performing
all PT tasks.
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
Automated Manual
Testing process Fast, standard process; Easily repeat-
able tests.
Manual, non-standard process; capital





Attack database is maintained and up-
dated attack codes are written for a va-
riety of platforms.
Maintenance of database is manual;
Need to rely on public databases; Need





Product vendor develops and main-
tains all exploits. Exploits are contin-
ually updated for maximum effective-
ness. Exploits are professionally de-
veloped, thoroughly tested, and safe to
run. Exploits are written and optimised
for various platforms and attack vec-
tors.
Developing and maintaining an exploit
database is time-consuming and re-
quires significant expertise. Public ex-
ploits are suspect and can be unsafe
to run. Re-writing and porting code is
necessary for cross-platform functional-
ity.
Reporting Reports are automated and customised. Requires collecting the data manually.
Clean-up Automated testing products offer
clean-up solutions.
The tester has to manually undo the




System remain unchanged. Often results in numerous system mod-
ifications.
Logging/ Auditing Automatically records a detailed record
of all activity.
Slow, cumbersome, often inaccurate
process.
Training Training for automated tools is easier
than manual testing.
Testers need to learn non-standard
ways of testing; Training can be cus-
tomised and is time-consuming.
Privacy Automated testing does not expose sen-
sitive information.
Human testers are at risk of leaking
sensitive information.
Table 1.1: Comparison between manual and automated PT
[69, 97]
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Figure 1.1: PT marketing by region [62]
• Partially autonomous (level 3): The system is semi-autonomous in per-
forming PT tasks. In this case, the system is under continuous supervision by
human experts.
• Decision-making assisting mode (level 2): The system acts alongside
with the human expert and assists him/her in the decision making.
• Learning mode (level 1): The system is running in the background to learn
from the decisions made by human experts when the human tester is performing
PT.
1.3 Research Question
This thesis attempts to answer the question of whether automated PT can be
achieved in real-time. To answer the main research question, the sub-questions
below must also be addressed:
• What artificial intelligence (AI) approaches can be used to deal with interactive,
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dynamic, uncertain and complex real-world PT scenarios?
• How can PT problems be modelled with these methods?
• How can an ontology be used to improve reasoning ability and enable knowledge
reusability within PT scenarios?
• How can automated PT be carried out in the IoT environment?
1.4 Motivation
Existing approaches to automation include those mapping vulnerability scanner re-
sults to the corresponding exploitation tools and those addressing the PT as a plan-
ning problem. Due to mainly non-interactive processing, such solutions can only
deal effectively with deterministic targets. However, the target environment of PT is
ordinarily dynamic, uncertain and complex. The penetration tester needs to interact
with the environment or targets and choose the best action to compromise the target
system based on the information collected. To deal with these issues, an agent-based
architecture is proposed for the automation of PT. An agent can interact with the
environment by perception, decision making and action.
Moreover, the behaviour of an agent can be flexible and is generally characterised
as autonomous, reactive, proactive and social. Currently, agent-based technologies
are considered promising for applications in various areas. The BDI model among
the classical and most representative models of cognitive architecture. It enables
agents to have cognitive abilities to deal with dynamic, uncertain and complex envi-
ronments by using mental states, and characteristics/attitudes such as belief, desire
and intention.
1.5 Contribution
This thesis proposed a BDI model to achieve real-time automation of PT and demon-
strated that the approach remains applicable in the environment of IoT. An ontology
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called OntoPT for PT was created to improve the reasoning ability of the BDI model.
This thesis successfully addressed the difficulties experienced in previous studies
which were unable to conduct PT in real-time and has improved performance.
1.6 Thesis Overview
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides a background to the research.
• Chapter 3 reviews the focus in previous research on related approaches as
well as contributions to the automation of PT.
• Chapter 4 introduces how automated PT can be achieved by using the agent-
based BDI architecture.
• Chapter 5 presents an ontology for PT and uses SWRL rules to achieve
reasoning ability.
• Chapter 6 considers IoT security problems and proposes a PT methodology
and its automation based on the BDI model to evaluate IoT security.
• Chapter 7 gives details of experiments applying the BDI model in a real
environment and their evaluation.
• Chapter 8 summarises the contribution of the research and indicates possible
directions for future study.
1.7 Summary
This chapter introduced the thesis, including a background to the field of PT, re-
search question, motivation, contribution and structure. Later chapters give a de-




This chapter describes the basic concepts of PT, agent architecture and ontology.
Section 2.1 introduces PT in terms of types, standards, process and tools. Section
2.2 discusses the agent architecture and BDI model used to implement the main
function of automated PT. Section 2.3 introduces the ontology used to increase the
reasoning ability of the BDI model.
2.2 Introduction to Penetration Testing
There are three basic PT types: Black-box testing, White-box testing and Grey-box
testing [91]. Each is discussed in further detail in the following sub-sections. Figure
2.1 shows the differences between the types of PT.
Black-box testing, also called external testing, occurs when the PT team has
no prior knowledge of targets. The PT team simulates a real-world attacker and
performs various real attacks on the target, from remote or external locations, to
discover the unknown vulnerabilities of the target system. Black-box testing can also
evaluate the responsiveness of the security team within the target organisation and
whether their defensive scheme is effective. However, Black-box testing is a time-
7
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Figure 2.1: Differences between the types of PT
consuming and challenging task that requires a high technical level of knowledge
among participants.
White-box testing, also called internal testing, occurs when the PT team has
knowledge of the targets, including network topology, system information, services,
ports, applications and even the source code. Therefore, the PT team can find
and verify the security issues of the target at minimal cost. Typically, White-box
testing can find and eliminate more security issues than Black-box testing. The
process of White-box testing is similar to that of Black-box testing, except that
it does not require information-gathering operations. However, White-box testing
cannot effectively evaluate the responsiveness of the security team within the target
organisation and whether their defensive scheme is effective.
Grey-box testing is a combination of White-box testing and Black-box that allows
for a more comprehensive and deeper security evaluation of the target system. A
Grey-box tester partially knows the details of the target, but not at the source code
level. Attacks mounted by Grey-box testing can achieve better results in external
PT than either White-box or Black-box testing.
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2.2.1 Penetration Testing Standards
PT is a highly complex task that requires participants to have a relatively high level
of skills and be able to engage in a wide variety of complex scenarios. Nevertheless,
according to the commonality of PT in methods, processes, and steps, there are some
execution standards in the information security field.
2.2.1.1 Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual
The Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) was published
by the Institute for Security and Open Methodologies (ISECOM) [41]. It is a popular
international standard for information security testing and analysis and is used in
many organisations. It covers all the elements of PT, including physical security, psy-
chology, data networks, wireless communication and telecommunications facilities.
In practice, OSSTMM can significantly reduce false negatives and false positives,
and provide more accurate security metrics. Among of OSSTMM’s more impor-
tant features are the fact it pays great attention to technical details and has good
operability.
2.2.1.2 NIST Special Publication 800-42
SP800 is a series of guidelines on information security issued by the NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology) in the United States. SP 800-42 [104] intro-
duces security testing techniques, system development life cycle, development strate-
gies and standard testing tools. Although it is not as comprehensive as OSSTMM,
it is accepted by the many organisation’s management department.
2.2.1.3 Penetration Testing Execution Standard
The Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) [76] is a relatively new stan-
dard, having been developed in 2010 by information security experts. It defines a
practical PT process which consists of seven stages. Moreover, it is a very compre-
hensive PT framework that covers all the technical aspects of PT, even including
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expert experience and related tools. PTES is currently one of the most popular PT
standards in the information security industry.
2.2.1.4 Open Web Application Security Project
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a non-profit organisation
that focuses on web security, providing security testers and developers with a guide-
line to identify and avoid security threats. Each year, OWASP publishes a top 10
[102] threats security report, which covers the most common security issues on web
applications. These reports are widely used and analysed in detail by information
security experts.
2.2.2 Penetration Testing Process
At present, PTES, has the following seven stages, has been widely accepted by the
security industry [76]. Each stage is discussed in further detail in the following
sub-sections.
2.2.2.1 Pre-engagement Interactions
In the pre-engagement interactions stage, the PT team discusses test technology, test
target, test scope, test cycle, test scheme and the corresponding price with clients.
In general, PT should not affect the availability of the target.
2.2.2.2 Information Gathering
After the pre-engagement interactions stage, the PT team needs to acquire knowl-
edge about the targets. Information gathering is one of the most critical stages in PT
and aims to collect as much information as possible to be utilised, such as physical
information, logic relationships, organisational structure, physical assets, individual
information, footprinting information and protection mechanisms. The more infor-
mation that can be collected during this stage, the more vectors of attack may be
used in the future.
Chapter 2. Preliminaries 11
2.2.2.3 Threat Modelling
After the information-gathering stage, the PT team conducts threat modelling and
attack planning to determine the most feasible attack path based on the information
obtained. The threat modelling consists of business asset analysis, business process
analysis, threat agents/community analysis, threat capability analysis, motivation
modelling, and finding relevant news of comparable organisations being compro-
mised. In terms of attack planning, PT teams determine the attack methods, tools
and schemes.
2.2.2.4 Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability analysis is a process of discovering vulnerabilities in systems and ap-
plications. The PT team needs to appropriately consider the scope of testing for
the depth and breadth of applications to meet the goals and/or requirements of the
desired outcome. The process of vulnerability analysis includes active testing, pas-
sive testing, validation and research. Sometimes, experienced teams can even find
zero-day (unknown) vulnerabilities in target systems.
2.2.2.5 Exploitation
The exploitation stage is the most challenging part of PT. The PT team performs
various real attacks on targets, such as SQL injection attack, password attack, buffer
overflow attack, cross-site scripting (XSS) attack, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
and social engineering attack. Typically, the targets are protected by different kinds
of countermeasures such as anti-virus, intrusion detection system (IDS), web ap-
plication firewall (WAF), packing, cryptography, white-black list, data execution
prevention (DEP) and address space layout randomisation (ASLR). Thus, the ex-
ploitation stage focuses on how to perform a successful attack by bypassing security
countermeasures in the target system. Moreover, in the case of Black-box testing,
the PT team must avoid being discovered by the target security team.
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2.2.2.6 Post Exploitation
The purpose of the post-exploitation stage is to keep control of the machine for fu-
ture use. In this stage, the PT team analyses network interfaces, routing, domain
name system (DNS), cache ARP tables, proxy servers, network services and direc-
tory information to identify other targets for further attack and install backdoor
programmes to maintain the long-term access privilege of a target. Sometimes, a
clean-up process is applied to systems once the PT has been completed.
2.2.2.7 Reporting
Finally, after the execution of the first six stages, a report is submitted to the client
for the entire task, which outlines all aspects of PT, such as objectives, methods and
results, and gives repair solutions. In general, the report includes a PT and technical
summary.
2.2.3 Taxonomy of Attacks
According to PT in practice [13], there are many types of attack, such as information-
gathering attack, configuration attack, buffer overflow attack, password attack, web
attack, sniffer attack, social engineering attack and denial-of-service (DOS) attack.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of attacks in PT. The first row of the table describes
the taxonomy of attacks, and the columns of the table respectively describe the
attack approaches or targets. This sub-section provides a review of the different
types of attack that can be anticipated.
2.2.3.1 Information Gathering
Information gathering is the most critical step in PT. Typically, the target informa-
tion to be collected includes IP address, open ports, application, OS type, human
or organisation information, network topology, defence mechanism, configuration,
vulnerability and physical environment. The collection of the above information
determines whether the PT will be successful or not.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2.3.2 Configuration Error Attack
This type of attack is usually based on an administrator’s configuration error of the
system. For example, the robot.txt file usually exposes the structure information
of the website, or the directory that allows users to upload files has executable
permission so attackers can upload and execute a malicious file.
2.2.3.3 Buffer Overflow Attack
A buffer overflow is a typical software coding mistake that an attacker could exploit
to gain access to the target system [56]. While writing data to a buffer, a programme
overruns the buffer’s boundary and overwrites adjacent memory locations. It allows
attackers to change the programme flow and execute their commands or programmes.
Buffer overflow is a widespread and very dangerous vulnerability; it appears in many
operating systems and application software. It is a famous attack used in PT.
2.2.3.4 Password Attack
Password attack is an essential part of PT. Usually, an attacker can gain specific
permission from the target system if a password attack is successful. Most password
attacks are based on a dictionary, which consists of possible passwords.
2.2.3.5 Web Attack
Web attack is an attack against web applications. The most common attacks are
injection, XSS, and cross-site request forgery (CSRF). The OWASP publishes a top
10 of vulnerabilities every year to raise awareness amongst developers and managers.
2.2.3.6 Sniffer Attack
If a target system has no known vulnerabilities, an experienced human penetration
tester typically attempts to perform a sniffer attack. They first break into other sys-
tems under the same sub-network with the original target, after which they monitor
and then analyse all network flow to gain sensitive information such as a password.
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2.2.3.7 Social Engineering Attack
Social engineering attacks are directed against humans, such as administrators or
users, who have weak security awareness. Social engineering refers to a variety of
malicious activities carried out through human interactions. In remote PT, these
attacks are usually performed using spear-phishing attacks by emails or links, website
forge attacks or spoofing attacks.
2.2.3.8 Denial of Service Attack
In a DoS attack, the attackers attempt to prevent legitimate users from accessing a
service. In this case, the attacker usually sends excessive data flow to the network
or server to exhaust target resources. DoS attacking is not typically used in PT
and usually leads to the reboot of the target system for some purpose. This kind of
attack includes SYN flood, TCP/UDP attack, SMTP attack and ICMP attack. If
the attack source comes from a different device, it is a distributed denial-of-service
attack (DDoS) attack.
2.2.4 Penetration Testing Tools
Various tools or frameworks are available in each PT stage to perform information
gathering and different kinds of attack. This section introduces some of the essential
penetration tools.
2.2.4.1 Penetration Testing Platform: Kali Linux
Kali Linux [3] is a Debian-based Linux distribution aimed at advanced PT and
security auditing, which is maintained and funded by Offensive Security. Kali Linux
contains more than 600 PT tools for various information security tasks, such as
PT, security research, computer forensics and reverse engineering. Kali Linux is
specifically designed to meet the needs of PT professionals.
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2.2.4.2 Information Gathering: Nmap
Nmap [60] is the best-known and most professional security scanner and can be used
to discover ports, hosts and services on a network. It was written in C/C++ and
Python by Gordon Lyon starting in 1997. To discover hosts on a network, Nmap
sends specially-built packets to the target host and then analyses responses. The
programme is different from other available port scanners. Nmap sends packets
based upon network conditions. Unlike other scanners, Nmap can not only scan
ports and discover online hosts but can also recognise the system type running in
remote hosts. In general, Nmap is an essential tool in the information-gathering
stage.
2.2.4.3 Vulnerability Scanner: Nessus and OpenVAS
A vulnerability scanner is a programme that automatically finds and discovers secu-
rity vulnerabilities in computers, information systems, networks and applications. It
identifies vulnerabilities by sending specific packets to the target and then analysing
responses to match its vulnerability database. Nessus [6] is the world’s most famous
vulnerability scanner, used by more than 75,000 organisations worldwide. The tool
provides a full vulnerability scanning function, and its vulnerability library is up-
dated very frequently. Similar to Nessus, OpenVAS [1] is an open-source branch
of the Nessus project and one of the most popular vulnerability scanners. In the
information-gathering stage, a vulnerability scanner is the best way to discover
known vulnerabilities in the target system.
2.2.4.4 Exploitation: Metasploit, Core Impact and CANVAS
Metasploit [52] is the most popular PT framework. It provides tools to be exploited
against remote targets and contains hundreds of professional exploit tools for known
software vulnerabilities. Before Metasploit was published, penetration testers had to
repeat the complex process of exploiting a code search, compiling, testing, modifying
exploit code, execute exploit until they achieved success. Metasploit not only collects
exploits but allows users to develop exploits in their environment.
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Core Impact [26] is an expensive commercial PT system developed by the com-
pany Core Security Technologies. It enables security teams to exploit security weak-
nesses, increase productivity and improve efficiency. Core Impact is designed for
users at every level, from beginners to experts, and all modules, exploits and tools
are written in Python. It includes professional exploit libraries and engines that
can perform PT on web applications, network systems, user terminals and wireless
networks.
CANVAS [39] includes hundreds of exploits and is an automated exploitation
system for penetration testers and security professionals worldwide. Moreover, it
is a platform designed to allow the easy development of other security products.
Immunity, the company which developed CANVAS, also provides services, products
and education around information security.
2.2.4.5 Password Attack Tools: Hydra and John the Ripper
Hydra is a powerful online password attack tool that can support most protocols or
applications, such as FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, MySQL, MSSQL, Oracle, Cisco, IMAP
and VNC. John the Ripper is a famous password attack tool in the Linux system.
The success rate of password cracking is related to the dictionary.
2.2.4.6 Web Security Assessment Framework: W3af and Sqlmap
W3af is a widely used web application attack and audit framework [85]. The project
aims to create a framework to help administrators secure their web applications
by finding and exploiting all web application vulnerabilities. This framework is
developed using Python thus it is easy to use and extend. W3af can identify more
than 200 vulnerabilities in web applications, including SQL injection, XSS, guessable
credentials, unhandled application errors and PHP configuration errors.
Sqlmap [7] is another web attack tool that automates the process of detecting
and exploiting SQL injection. It has a powerful engine that automates the following
operations: (I) database Identification, (II) obtain data from the database, (III)
accessing the underlying file system and (IV) executing commands on the operating
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system.
2.2.4.7 Man-in-the-Middle Attack Tool: Ettercap
An MITM attack is performed through data tampering and sniffing attacks by in-
tercepting communication data in a target network [15]. Usually, MITM attacks are
difficult to detect. Ettercap [78] is a comprehensive suite for MITM attacks, which
can be used for computer network protocol analysis and security auditing. It fea-
tures, among other elements, sniffing live connections and content filtering. Ettercap
supports the active and passive dissection of many protocols.
2.2.4.8 Social Engineering Attack Tool: SET
Social engineering attack [74] is an attack vector that relies heavily on human in-
teraction and often involves manipulating people into breaking standard security
procedures and best practices to gain access to systems, networks or physical loca-
tions, or for financial gain. In high-level PT, targets are often well protected; thus
social engineering attacks are often the key to success for the attacker. SET [19] is
the best-known social engineering tool and can perform 11 kinds of social engineering
attack.
2.3 Introduction to Agent Architectures
During PT, humans are often required to constantly interact with the target and
act accordingly to the target’s response. The agent architecture is a candidate for
simulating and solving PT interaction problems. The agent is a critical concept in
the field of AI. It refers to software or hardware entities that can autonomously inter-
act with an environment where they can monitor and respond to changes proactively
and reactively or communicate with other agents to achieve certain goals/tasks [108].
In other words, agents can perceive their environment through sensors and perform
possible actions to change it via effectors or actuators (see Figure 2.2). The most
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important question for the agent is how to decide what to do according to the infor-
mation gained from its perception. The agent function maps any percept sequences
to an action (as shown in Equation (2.1)).
f : P ∗ → A (2.1)
The environment for an agent may be physical or software. An agent possesses
certain distinct characteristics, such as the following [109]:
• Autonomous: the ability that automatically adjusts its behaviour according
to changes in the external environment.
• Social: the ability to interact with humans and other agents.
• Reactive: the ability to perceive and respond to changes in the environment.
• Proactive: the ability to show goal-directed behaviour.




The agent architecture is the foundation of any agent reasoning mechanism and is
intended to support a decision-making process. The agent architecture is a critical
part of the agent. It determines how the knowledge or information is represented and
what actions the agent should take, based on a reasoning mechanism. Three types
of agent architecture have been proposed: (I) classical architecture, (II) cognitive
architecture and (III) semantic architecture [17]. Classical architecture encompasses
logic-based architecture, reactive architecture, BDI architecture and hybrid architec-
ture. Logic-based architecture is based on the traditional artificial symbolic approach
to modelling the environment and agent actions. The logic-based approach is a de-
duction process based on a set of inference rules. The main problem of logic-based
architecture is that it is difficult to translate perception or environmental information
into symbolic representation for reasoning. Reactive agent architecture is based on
the match of a situation to an action without reasoning ability. In this architecture,
an agent takes an action according to a change in the environment, and each situation
is mapped into an action. The advantage of reactive architecture is that it is easy
to design and implement. However, this architecture has less long-term planning
ability. Therefore, it is not easy to build task-driven agents and solve complex tasks.
Hybrid architecture allows both reactive and deliberate agent behaviour, consisting
of two types of interaction that flow between the horizontal and vertical layers. Cog-
nitive architecture is based on cognitive sciences, which focus on human cognition
and psychology, while semantic architecture is adopted into semantic technology.
2.3.2 BDI Agent Architecture
BDI architecture is based on practical reasoning, as proposed by Bratman [11]. Prac-
tical reasoning is reasoning toward actions, the process of determining what to do,
while the theoretical reasoning process aims to obtain conclusions by using knowl-
edge. Human practical reasoning consists of two activities, namely deliberation and
means-end reasoning. Deliberation describes the state of affairs which needs to be
achieved, and means-end reasoning represents how to achieve such state of affairs.
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Means-end reasoning is better known in the AI field as planning [32], which gener-
ates a course of action to achieve a specific goal. The major problems within this
approach are that it is very computationally costly and incapable of planning and
acting in real-time. Agent technology is a natural candidate approach to deal with
complex tasks in a dynamic environment. In BDI architecture, agents consist of
three logical components representing mental states namely:
• Beliefs: information the agent has about the environment.
• Desires: the agents motivation or possible options that the agent may like to
carry out.
• Intentions: the states of affairs that the agent has decided to carry out.
Intentions are key components in practical reasoning and critical to an agent’s suc-
cess. The BDI is the best-known architecture [83] and the procedural reasoning
system (PRS) is one of its best-known implementations. PRS was initially devel-
oped at Stanford Research Institute by Michael Georgeff and Amy Lansky [31]. It
has proved to be one of the most durable approaches to develop agents to date. To
build a real-time reasoning system, PRS can deal with complex tasks in dynamic
environments. The architecture of PRS consists of four key features: beliefs, desires,
intentions and plans, and an interpreter (See Figure 2.3).
In the PRS system, plans indicate a course of action for the agent to achieve its
intentions. Plans are manually constructed and pre-defined with a library by the
agent programmer. Plans in the PRS have the following components:
• a context: the pre-condition of the plan.
• a body: the course of actions to carry out.
• a goal: the post-condition of the plan.
The agent interpreter is used to update beliefs from observations of the envi-
ronment, generating new desires based on beliefs and selecting desires to act as
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Figure 2.3: The Procedural Reasoning System (PRS)
[10]
intentions. Finally, the interpreter selects an action to perform the agent’s current
intentions. Since the mid-1980s, the PRS has been re-implemented several times,
such as the Australian AI Institutes dMARS system [24], the University of Michi-
gans C++ implementation UM-PRS and a Java version called JAM! [46]. JACK
extends the Java language with a number of BDI features [14], while a program-
ming language called AgentSpeak is used to define a programme in the form of plans
[10]. Some implementations support BDI-style programming as libraries, such as
BDIPython [12].
2.4 Ontology
The concept of an ontology [36] comes from the field of philosophy and has been
widely used for knowledge representation in the field of AI in recent years. It can
be used to describe concepts and their relationships in a certain domain. The main
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components of an ontology are classes, relations, functions, axioms and instances.
An ontology can be created by Protege [75], a widely-used open-source ontology
editor and knowledge management system. With the assistance of domain experts,
researchers have established ontologies in many areas. For example, the SENSUS
ontology [55] provides a conceptual structure for machine translation, the UMLS
ontology [9] is a medical language system, the CYC ontology [59] is used to establish
human common sense, and an English dictionary is based on the cognitive linguistics
Word-Net ontology [68]. An example of an attack ontology is shown in 2.4.
Figure 2.4: An example of an attack ontology
An ontology not only allows domain knowledge to be shared and reused through
a formalisation, but it also has an excellent conceptual hierarchy and support for
logical reasoning. The SWRL [44] is a semantic web rule language combining the Web
Ontology Language (OWL) and RuleML, which can be used to implement inference
functions and create a knowledge base. SWRL can be regarded as a combination of
rules and an ontology; it can directly use relationships and vocabulary in an ontology.
The SWRL rules have two parts, a body and a head, which represent a precondition
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and post-condition. The body and head consist of a set of atoms, which are the
smallest unit in a rule.
Drawing on the benefits outlined above, this thesis establishes an ontology to
describe the relationship between targets, vulnerabilities and attack actions. Using
SWRL and an ontology, the reasoning ability of the BDI model is strengthened.
2.5 Summary
This chapter introduced background knowledge related to this thesis about PT, agent
architectures, especially the BDI model, and ontology. The BDI model provides
reasoning from action output to environmental response. The taxonomy of PT is
used to create a PT ontology. Based on ontology, the ability of BDI reasoning can
be improved. This research follows the PTES PT standard and process, while the




To date, there has been little academic research on automated PT, and the field
is still in its infancy [65]. Many studies or implementations lend to only mapping
vulnerability scanner results to the corresponding exploitation tools [38]. Most of the
research addresses PT as a planning problem expressed in terms of an attack tree,
an attack graph, or based on PDDL. Some researchers have attempted to achieve
automated PT using the POMDP. Ontologies are also widely used to represent, share
and reuse knowledge in the information security field. This chapter introduces the
above content in detail.
3.2 Attack Tree
Attack trees are conceptual structures describing how an asset or a target might
be attacked, and were first proposed by Bruce Schneier [90]. An attack tree has
been used to describe threats to and possible attacks on targets. If administrators
have knowledge of all the different ways of attacking a system, it is easy to design
countermeasures to mitigate these attacks. Basically, attacks are represented in
a tree structure. The root node represents the target, and other nodes represent
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different attack actions. Figure 3.1 presents an example of an attack tree. The OR
Figure 3.1: Example of an attack tree
[107]
nodes indicate alternative ways to achieve the goal, while the AND nodes represent
the steps that should be taken to achieve the same goal. Attackers cannot achieve
the goal unless all sub-goals are satisfied.
To systematically model cyber-attacks, an attack specification language was spec-
ified in [101] to express aggregate attack behaviours and modalities. Each attack
model contains descriptive properties, pre-conditions, sub-goals and post-conditions.
Properties are used to express attack characteristics, such as attack description, CVE
link and version. Pre-conditions indicate the system environment or configuration
properties. Sub-goals represent antecedent objectives of system intrusions or com-
promises. Post-conditions refer to state changes in systems and environments or the
effect of attacks. Using the attack specification language, the attack decision-making
problem can be transferred to an attack tree search problem.
An attacker can use an attack tree to paths to compromise the targets. Naturally,
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attack trees can be used to perform automated PT. In [111], the rule trees method
was used to achieve the automation of PT; each chain of rule trees stores a complete
attack process. The likelihood of an attack can be calculated according to their
vulnerability information table and threat classification model. They also proposed
the security assessment process to meet NIST guidelines. In theory, the result of
their approach can be improved by adding a number of rules. In [77], a penetration
attack tree model can describe, organise, classify, manage and schedule the attacks
for an attack resistance test. This model integrated the attack execution relations
and attribute relations, which can be used to construct the unification description
of the test plan and attack operation sequence to guide the tests to complete PT
tasks. Firstly, they established the penetration attack tree based on an attack tree
structure and redefine two kinds of nodes, such as attack attribute and characteristic
node (AttN) and attack behaviour node (BehN) as well as using “and” and “or” to
express the relationship of nodes. Then, they established the attack behaviour node
execution order sequence, based on the penetration attack tree, in order to assist
attack implementation.
The advantages of the attack tree model are that it is intuitive and easy to
understand. It not only describes the attack path but also quantifies the various
factors of the attack. However, the disadvantages of attack trees are also apparent.
The scalability of the structure of attack trees is limited. For example, and/or nodes
are difficult to prune and extend. Moreover, it is challenging to model complex
relations between various attacks using attack trees. Another problem associated
with attack trees is that they are computationally expensive due to the numerous
state spaces. Attack trees face challenges in decision-making environments where
an agent must plan and act in real-time. In addition, the attack tree model is not
suitable for multi-objective scenarios.
3.3 Attack Graph
Attack graphs were first proposed by Swiler in 1998 [99]. They are a type of directed
graph that can describe all paths that an attacker can take to reach the target from
28 Ge Chu
the starting point of the attack. Nodes in an attack graph represent state of the
attack, for example, the target machines to which the attacker has gained access
and the user privilege the attack has compromised. Arcs represent a change of state
caused by a single action taken by the attacker. By assigning probabilities of attack
success to the arcs, various graph algorithms, such as shortest-path algorithms, can
identify attack paths with the highest probability of success. The attack graph
can be generated by three components: attack templates, a configuration file and
an attacker profile. The Attack templates consist of the information or conditions
which must hold for the attack, such as operating system version or open port. The
configuration file gives information about target systems, including the topology
of the network, configuration information of workstations, printers or routers. The
attacker profile provides information about the attacker’s capabilities, such as attack
actions. The attack graph not only describes multiple attackers and multiple targets
but also supports reasoning.
There are two types of attack graphs: state-based attack graphs and attribute-
based attack graphs [16]. In state-based attack graphs, each node represents network
states or attack states such as operating system version, open ports, services, vulner-
abilities and user privilege. The arcs represent the path of transition from one state
to another. The state attack graph can show all possible attack paths from the initial
state to a goal state. However, the number of attack paths increases exponentially
according to the scale and number of target vulnerabilities. Therefore, this type of
attack graph is not suitable for large-scale networks. In contrast, attribute-based
attack graphs have better scalability in large-scale network [47]. Attribute-based
attack graphs have two types of nodes, which represent atomic attacks and attribute
nodes, respectively. The attribute node indicates the pre-condition and effects of
atomic attacks. Figure 3.2 demonstrates an example of an attribute attack graph
[93]. Each node includes an attack ID number, which indicates the atomic attack; a
flag S/D shows whether the attack is detectable or not by intrusion detection system,
as well as the sources and targets. The paths from a root node to a leaf node shows
a sequence of atomic attacks the attacker can act without being detected.
In many network security analyses based on attack graphs, researchers have con-
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Figure 3.2: An example of an attribute attack graph
[93]
structed attack graphs based on their network and vulnerability modelling to de-
termine whether attacks can gain access privilege from starting location to targets.
Artz et al. [5] described the first version of the Network Security Planning Archi-
tecture (NetSPA) system implemented using C++. Its input information from a
custom database includes host, software types and versions, network vulnerabilities,
intrusion detection system placement, gateways, firewall rules and exploits. This tool
generates attack graphs based on the input information, then uses a depth-limited
forward chaining depth-first search algorithm. The authors evaluated this tool in a
realistic network with 17 hosts; it took less than 90 seconds to produce three attack
graph layers.
Kyle Ingols et al. [49] described major improvements to the NetSPA attack
graph system. It requires to model zero-day exploits, client-side attacks and coun-
termeasures such as intrusion prevention system (IPS) and proxy and personal fire-
walls. NetSPA models reachability, firewall, branching between chains, network ad-
dress translation (NAT), reverse reachability, non-transparent proxy and IPS system.
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However, the scaling is poor because it generates a full attack graph that finds all
paths to all possible goals. In addition, NetSPA has not modelled attacks specific to
a web server or database, such as SQL injection and XSS.
Ammann et al. described a polynomial algorithm [4] that can be used to generate
attack graphs based on vulnerabilities, attacker privileges and exploits. The algo-
rithm can compute paths to a goal and determine the minimum attack actions that
can be used. The main problem of this approach is that it cannot deal with changes
in network state; for example, DoS attacks cannot be modelled in the approach.
Jajodia et al. [50] described a topological vulnerability analysis (TVA) tool which
automates the labour-intensive type of analysis performed by penetration testers.
The TVA tool requires vulnerability information from the Nessus vulnerability scan-
ner. Nevertheless, conditions of exploits, attack goals and network topology need to
be provided by hand. This tool can generate and analyse attack graphs based on
a polynomial-time algorithm [4] to prevent the attacker from reaching goal states.
This was one of the most comprehensive tools, before 2005, for the generation and
analysis of attack graphs. However, firewalls and router rules are not analysed and
there is poor scaling to large networks.
Some studies have present formal languages that can be used to describe ac-
tions and states in attack graphs. These languages define the pre-conditions and
post-conditions of an attacker action to represent the premises and effects of such
an action. In addition, these languages describe network components such as hosts,
routers, firewalls, topology and vulnerabilities. Templeton et al. regarded attacks
as a set of capabilities supporting abstract attack concepts [100]. When the require-
ments of these concepts are satisfied, the concept provides capabilities that other
concepts can use. An example of a scenario attack is presented in a language called
JIGSAW to show the model of remote shell connection spoofing. This is one of
the first papers to present how attack scenarios can be generated automatically to
achieve multiple attack actions. The main weakness of this research is that it re-
quires a great deal of human labour to manually describe the concepts in JIGSAW.
Cuppens et al. presented an attack description language based on logic which uses
a declarative approach to describe attack scenarios as a combination of actions [20].
Chapter 3. Related Work 31
In the language, the conditions and effects of an attack are described with logi-
cal formulas and provide a description of the attack from the point of view of the
attacker.
Some reported research has applied genetic algorithms or security metric models
in attack graph generation methods. Alhomidi et al. [2] proposed a graph-based risk
assessment model, which helps organisations and decision-makers to make appro-
priate decisions in terms of security risks. They also developed a genetic algorithm
(GA) approach to determine the risks of attack paths and produced useful numeric
values for the overall risk of a given network. The algorithm provided a natural way
of exploring a large number of possible attack paths. However, it may omit high-risk
paths. Wang et al. [106] proposed an attack graph-based probabilistic metric for
network security. The authors defined the basic metric and provided an intuitive and
meaningful interpretation of it. Computing the metric directly from its definition is
not efficient in many cases; to solve this problem, the authors proposed heuristics to
improve the efficiency of such computation.
To take the probability of an attack of each attack path into consideration, some
researchers have tried to make use of Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
information to generate attack graphs. Gallon et al. [28] proposed to combine attack
graphs and a CVSS framework in order to add damage and exploitability probability
information. They defined a notion of risk for each attack scenario based on quan-
titative information added to attack graphs. However, this approach is not suitable
for large networks. Keramati et al. [53] proposed a method that can measure the
impact of each shown attack in the attack graph on the security parameters (con-
fidentiality, availability and integrity) of the network. They defined some security
metrics by combining a CVSS framework and attack graph that can help to assess
network security quantitatively by analysing attack graphs as well as finding the
most perilous vulnerability in the network. The main problem of this method is that
it takes no account of the issues of the circular path and combination explosion.
In the most recent studies, published in 2020, researchers utilised MulVAL [80]
to generate attack graphs. Drew Malzahn et al. [61] presented an automated vul-
nerability and risk analysis (AVRA) approach for use in cyber risk assessments. A
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scanner is used to capture system information and generate attack graphs using
MulVAL. Finally, AVRA executes the attack graph to verify and validate vulnera-
bilities using Metasploit. The limitations associated with AVRA are that the results
of AVRA are strongly dependent on the quality of the input data and it is difficult
translate from system fact to exploit parameter.
Researchers have also tried to combine attack graphs with reinforcement learn-
ing. Zhenguo Hu et al. [45] used the Shodan search engine [96] to capture system
information and generate an attack graph using MulVAL. Unlike other studies, the
authors first used a depth-first search (DFS) algorithm to find all possible attack
paths and construct a simplified transfer matrix. Finally, they utilised the deep Q-
learning network (DQN) algorithm [70] to determine the optimal attack path and
execute the attack graph using Metasploit. Similarly, Ankur Chowdary et al. [18]
proposed an autonomous security analysis and penetration (ASAP) testing frame-
work. The authors used MulVAL to generate an attack graph based on network
service and vulnerability information. The attack graph is stored in an XML file.
The CVSS [66] is used to determine the reward function in DQN to generate attack
plans. Finally, the authors used an ELK server [95] to obtain evidence of a successful
attack performed by Metasploit. However, these studies did not prove that the DQN
improves the performance of attack graphs.
Attack graphs can generate all possible attacks in the network and provide the
perspective of an attacker. Intuitively, they can help to achieve automation of PT.
However, the main shortcoming of attack graphs is that the output is usually a
path, namely a sequence of actions from the initial state to the goal state. In fact,
automation of PT needs not only to plan but to execute actions in real-time to
interact with dynamic decision-making environments. In other words, the problem
that has not yet been addressed is how to execute and validate the attack paths from
the analysis of the attack graph. Another limitation is that the scalability of attack
graphs is poor, and the computation is expensive because the number of targets or
states grows exponentially in attack graphs. Generating an attack graph is time-
consuming, and it is difficult to select the optimal path if the system model is large
or complicated.
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3.4 PDDL-based Attack Planning
Automated planning (AP) is a process of selecting actions in achieving expected
outcomes, and plays a significant role in various AI applications [32]. It is the AI
branch that automates reasoning about plans and formulates a plan to achieve a
specific goal in a given situation. A planning system takes as input a description
of the initial state, the actions available and the conditions to reach a goal. The
output of a planning system is a sequence of actions to be executed from the initial
state to the goal. The PDDL is a formal knowledge representation language designed
to express planning models. It is commonly used for encoding domain knowledge
[64] into a PDDL domain file and a problem file. Each PDDL problem description
includes a set of world objects, an initial condition and a goal description. There
are various classical and forward heuristic planners available, such as Metric-FF [42],
which use problem-solving techniques to generate attack plans. A planner begins its
execution from the initial state with a graph-based representation called plangraph.
The plangraph is generated starting from the initial state; successive application of
state transition operators over all instances are then used to maps states and goals
into actions [63].
Many studies make use of PDDL to express the action needed for attack planning
and to model the problem of PT. Boddy et al. made use of classical planning
to generate hypothetical attack scenarios to exploit the system [8]. Their study
applies classical planning techniques to analyse computer network vulnerabilities
and generate courses of action from the initial state to the attacker’s goal. Their
behavioral adversary modelling system (BAMS) is based on PDDL and Metric-FF
planner, which includes 25 different objects, 124 predicates and 56 actions, while
each problem contains 200 to 300 facts. This application has demonstrated the
generation of attack plans for a simple but realistic model of a web-based document
management system.
To solve the scalability problem of the attack graph, Ghosh et al. [35] proposed
an approach based on GraphPlan planner, PDDL and a customised attack path
enumeration algorithm to generate minimal attack paths. Their model can be scaled
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to realistic and complex networks. The analysis shows that the attack graphs using
customised algorithms can be generated in polynomial time.
Similarly, researchers have presented a complete PDDL representation of an at-
tack model and integrated a planner into a PT framework [79]. A transformation
algorithm is used to convert attack models into PDDL representation. Attack infor-
mation includes initial conditions, PDDL actions and the goal encoded into a domain
file. In contrast, the information about systems, such as networks, machines, oper-
ating systems, ports and running services, is stored in a problem file. The PT tool
includes about 700 exploits, and the PDDL domain has about 1800 actions.
Roberts et al. complemented previous approaches by integrating user actions and
supporting personalisation to extend attack graphs [86]. Their work focus to those
vulnerabilities present in a particular user/system combination based on PDDL and
Metric-FF planner. In the same year, Elsbroek et al. [25] designed a FIDIUS system
for an intelligent vulnerability testing tool. The system consists of the knowledge,
decision and action components, which represent information about targets, plan-
ning for the next steps based on the current knowledge, and action space. The
critical component is the decision, which includes two intelligent agents: one using
action state planning for attack plan generation based on PDDL, FF planner and
cFF planner while the other predicts of a hosts value based on a neural network.
The planner-based agents cannot be used in a Black-box scenario as the agent plans
everything in advance, while the hosts value prediction agent decides which is the
next host to be exploited rather than the following action to be executed. The ac-
tion component is based on Metasploit. Previous approaches based on PDDL attack
planning have been limited due to its inability to deal with uncertain situations. To
address this issue, Sarraute et al. proposed a model that takes into account the prob-
ability of success of the actions and their expected cost [89]. Their planner is based
on the PPDDL language [110], an extension of PDDL for expressing probabilistic
effects, and was integrated into the PT framework Core Impact. They showed that
probabilistic attack planning could be solved efficiently for large networks.
PDDL-based attack planning for security testing has attracted a large number
of studies showing how to execute and validate the attack paths which result from
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analysis of the attack graph. In addition, planners can solve the scalability issues of
attack graphs. However, the main drawback is that it uses classical planning. The
system cannot handle incomplete knowledge, uncertainty and interaction with the
dynamic environment, because the result of a planner is a list of actions.
3.5 POMDP Model for Penetration Testing
A POMDP is a model for decision making under uncertainty [71] and usually defined
by a tuple <S, A, T, R, Z, O> where,
• s ∈ S (state space) represents a finite set of possible states about the environ-
ment.
• a ∈ A (action space) represents a finite set of possible actions available.
• T (state transition function) T(s, a, s’) = Pr(s’| s, a) represents the probabilistic
relationship about how the state of the world can be changed by executing the
actions.
• R (reward function) R(s, a) describes how the agent should behave.
• Z (observation space) o ∈ Z represents a finite set of observations of the state.
• O (observation function) O(s’, a, o) = Pr(o|s’, a) describes the relationship
between the states and observations.
POMDP aims to find out an optimal policy π that maps states to actions where:
π : S → A. The optimal policy gives the best actions at each state based on its
observations and maximises its future gain (total reward). Figure 3.3 shows an
illustration of the POMDP model.
Compared to the classical deterministic planning mentioned above, the agent
has to interact with a system with an uncertain dynamic environment and whose
current state is unknown. The choice and effect of actions are also uncertain. As
PT concerns acting under uncertain scenarios, POMDP is a natural candidate to
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Figure 3.3: POMDP model
[84]
model this particular problem. Sarraute et al. [88] modelled the PT problem in
terms of POMDP. They modelled the states to describe target information such as
OS, software version and vulnerabilities. In addition, a terminal state was used to
describe quitting. Two types of actions, tests and exploits, were taken from a Core
Security database, which allowed them to collect information about targets such as
OS detection and port scan and then exploit targets. They modelled the reward
function in terms of the asset value, maximum time and detection risk. In contrast,
no reward was received when the terminate action is executed or once the terminal
state is reached. The transition function and observation function were specified as
the action’s transition matrix and probability 0 or 1. In this research, generating
a POMDP model for PT required knowledge about states, actions, observations,
reward function, transition function and the initial belief state. To solve the POMDP
problem, Kurniawati et al. [57] used an approximate POMDP planning (APPL)
solver written in C++ based on the SARSOP algorithm. However, the research
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concluded by raising the scaling issue that limits POMDP in PT scenarios. If the
number of hosts increases, the time needed to find exploits grows exponentially.
Further research [87] proposed a method to generate better attack plans for a
particular machine within a short period. The author’s solution applied POMDP
to find feasible attacks for each machine. The research tried to solve the scalability
issues using an additional 4AL decomposition algorithm to create policies for each
attack graph. However, the issue of scalability has not been resolved in realistic PT
scenarios.
Despite all its advantages, POMDP has two major limitations: firstly, its scala-
bility is a significant issue. Secondly, it is difficult to design the initial belief for every
real-world problem and its accurate probability distribution. In the PT scenario, it
is unclear how agents can obtain these distributions. Additionally, POMDP models
are complicated and require expensive computational resources.
3.6 Ontology for Information Security
Knowledge of PT is usually acquired by a small number of individuals, and it is
difficult to share and reuse. Moreover, the establishment and management of the
knowledge base are the most challenging and critical problems in automated PT
research. Some previous work has been performed on taxonomy and ontology in the
security field, which is the foundation of the automated PT approach.
Pinkstion et al. [82] produced an ontology specifying a model of computer attacks
based on over 4,000 classes of computer attacks for intrusion detection. The classes
were categorised according to the system component targeted, means of attack, con-
sequence of attack and location of the attacker. The authors presented their model
as a target-centric ontology and illustrated the benefits of an ontology instead of a
taxonomy.
Herzog et al. [40] presented an ontology of information security that models
assets, threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures and their relations. This ontology
covered general knowledge and can be used as a vocabulary, roadmap and extensible
dictionary of information security. The ontology was also used for reasoning about
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relationships between entities, and answering questions about information security.
Hansman et al. [37] provided a method for the analysis and categorisation of
both computer and network attacks. The taxonomy was designed to deal with an
increasing number of attacks every day and consists of four dimensions: attack vector,
attack targets, vulnerabilities and payloads.
Venter et al. [103] discussed a taxonomy for information security technologies,
which are used to secure information at the application, host and network level. The
authors described security technologies in terms of two categories: proactive and
reactive. Gao et al. [30] proposed a taxonomy that consisted of five dimensions,
namely attack impact, attack vector, attack target, vulnerability and defence. The
authors also provided a method to evaluate the effect after an attack.
Some ontologies have been based on vulnerabilities as opposed to ontologies built
to capture attack or information security concepts. For example, Wang et al. [105]
built an ontology for vulnerability management (OVM) which was populated with
all vulnerabilities in NVD, such as CVE, CWE, CVSS and CAPEC, and the rela-
tionships among them.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, related research about the automation of PT was reviewed, including
attack trees, attack graphs, PDDL-based attack planning, POMDP and ontology.
These methods have their own characteristics and limitations and do not carry out
real-time automated PT. In the next chapter, an agent model is introduced to solve
the problems.
Chapter 4
BDI Architecture for Penetration
Testing
4.1 Introduction
Related research has used planning algorithms to model PT. However, these solutions
either cannot handle incomplete knowledge, uncertainty and a dynamic environment
or they exhibit poor scaling. This chapter presents the BDI architecture, which
provides a complete practical reasoning framework for automation of PT and re-
porting. The BDI knowledge base is used for decision making, which includes expert
experience.
4.2 Analysis of Penetration Testing Problem
PT implies the external security evaluation of an organisation by an analyst, identify-
ing vulnerabilities and assessing possible attack actions. As a widely-used evaluation
approach for information security, PT possesses specific characteristics, such as:
• Interactivity: PT is an activity whereby attackers can execute actions di-
rected at target environments and receive responses.
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• Dynamic: The state of the target environment may change after an attacker
carries out actions.
• Uncertainty: The knowledge and response of the target environment are un-
certain. In Black-box PT, attackers usually cannot obtain accurate information
about targets. Moreover, the action effects of targeting the environment are
unknown.
• Complexity: In PT, the state space and action space are infinite in theory
because the target configuration is infinite and attackers can carry out infinite
actions to obtain target privilege. Usually, attackers need to choose the best
actions based on their experience.
4.2.1 Environment
In general, the PT environment refers to various hardware targets, including hosts,
firewalls, gateways, routers, network bridges, modems, wireless access points, switches,
hubs and repeaters. Also, the environment includes information about targets such
as IP address, operating system, configurations, open port, DNS, services, network
topology, protocols, vulnerabilities, users and privileges. In practice, environmental
information is unknown, and attackers try to collect as much information as possible
about the environment at the information-gathering stage.
4.2.2 State
States refer to the changes of environment or attacker’s privilege. In the context of
PT, there is no need to know the full state of the system to describe the current
situation but only to focus on aspects that are relevant to the task. In addition, a
terminal state indicates whether the PT is successful or has terminated, as any PT
has a finite execution.
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4.2.3 Action
Actions refer to any executions that an attacker can carry out during PT. These
actions include either known PT tools such as Metasploit or attack scripts created
by attackers in order to acquire information about targets or attempt to obtain
privileges from targets by exploiting a vulnerability. Typically, each action has pre-
conditions and post-conditions.
4.2.4 Decision Making
When action space and environmental information are available, attackers need to
carry out actions to interact with environments based on their skills and experi-
ence. According to previous experience, attackers know how to perform actions in
particular states. Sometimes, attackers make decisions according to their intuition.
4.2.5 Goal
The goal created for the agent needs to be consistent and achievable [23]. PT is a
process of identifying vulnerabilities by performing real attacks from the prospect of
an attacker. The goal of PT is to obtain high-level access privileges, such as root
or administrator, in target systems. However, the goal is not always achievable in
practice, a terminal state is needed to avoid infinite loops. Attackers can perform
various attacks to exploit targets and do not need to find the shortest attack path.
PT is more concerned about whether it can succeed in a specific time rather than
succeed in the shortest time.
4.3 BDI Architecture for Penetration Testing
According to the analysis above, agent-based BDI is a natural candidate to solve
the automation of PT. It provides a complete practical reasoning framework that




In the process of PT, the BDI agent interacts with the target by perceiving informa-
tion, and in response, it outputs actions to change it. In the BDI model, the attacker
agent is single, while the number of targets is unlimited. The agent world consists of
a network environment such as the Internet or the local area network. It is assumed
that the agent can interact with targets via different kinds of connections, either
wired or wireless.
4.3.2 Action Space
In the action space, different actions have been defined to be performed throughout
the whole PT process, from the information-gathering stage to the report stage.
Whereas some scanners or PT tools provide a degree of automation, the BDI model
can execute external tools directly as part of the action space to make this model
more extensible. Moreover, the BDI model can perform various types of attacks,
such as buffer overflow attack, SQL injection attack, password attack, sniffer attack
and social engineering attack. In the BDI model, most actions are derived from the
Metasploit framework.
4.3.3 BDI Model
The BDI model expects the agent to act in a dynamic environment such that the
agents reasoning should take environmental changes into account to make an action.
It can properly define the process whereby agents choose actions based on target
information in PT. The basic logical components of a BDI agent are belief, desire
and intention.
A BDI agent is defined as a tuple < Ag, B, D, I, P, A, S; fBS, fBI ,fBDI >, where:
• Ag is an agent’s name.
• B is a set of beliefs.
• D is a set of desires.
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• I is a set of intentions.
• P is a set of plans.
• A is a set of actions.
• S is a set of perceptions.
• fBS is a belief update function.
• fBI is a desire determination function.
• fBDI is an intention generation function.
Belief set B represents environment or state information about the target, which
is updated after executing actions. In general, beliefs are represented symbolically
by ground atoms of first-order logic. At the early stage of PT, information-gathering
actions build belief set B to signify environmental information in terms of different
values and parameters from the agent’s perception. The function fBS shows that
the new beliefs can be generated based on current beliefs and perceived information
in the perception set S.
fBS : B × S → B (4.1)
Desire set D represents all the options or possible candidate plans of PT for
the agent that an agent might like to accomplish. In real-time PT, multiple types
of attack methods can be carried out in response to specific target information. For
example, if the hosts port 80 is left open, a number of attacks might be carried out,
including SQL injection attack, password attack or buffer overflow attack. Human
penetration testers would need to choose one type of attack according to their expe-
rience or preferences. The function fBI shows that the desires are determined based
on beliefs and intentions.
fBI : B × I → D (4.2)
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Intention set I represents the agent’s goals or the plans the agent decides to
carry out. In PT, the agent needs to choose one plan to carry out from the possible
candidate plans. The plan becomes an intention after being selected. The function
fBDI shows that beliefs, desires and intentions can generate new intentions.
fBDI : B ×D × I → I (4.3)
Action set A is used to represent minimal attack units, driving an agent to
achieve PT goals.
Plan set P consists of available plans, each giving information about (1) how
to respond to events, and (2) how to achieve goals. A plan comprises three parts:
trigger event, context and body, where:
• Trigger Event: is an event that the plan can handle, such as beliefs or goals
about the target environment or state information.
• Context: defines the conditions under which the plan can be used. In PT,
each attack needs to meet specific conditions.
• Body: defines a series of actions to be executed if the plan is chosen. It is
possible to have goals. The BDI model covers various types of attack actions,
combinations of which are pre-defined.
Given the description of the BDI architecture above, the dynamic process and
reasoning cycle of a BDI agent for PT can be depicted as shown in Figure 4.1. The
process is as follows:
1. Initial beliefs and intentions are set up by the penetration tester and typically
represent information regarding the target, such as the domain or IP address and
the privilege that the PT must achieve.
2. The BDI agent perceives the target information by performing various information-
gathering actions. For example, Nmap can collect OS type and ports from the target.
3. After the gathered information is perceived, current beliefs are updated. At
this time, the BDI agent should hold the information about the target.
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4. According to the new current belief, all relevant action plans are found. For
example, if port 80 of the target is open, then password attack, buffer overflow attack
and SQL injection attack become candidate options for the human penetration tester.
5. The BDI agent chooses one plan from the candidate action plans to become
the intention and waits for it to be executed according to the plan’s context. A plan
can be taken from a human knowledge database. The priority of all actions is defined
in a human knowledge database.
6. The BDI agent executes the chosen plan. If the plan fails, then the agent
chooses another plan.
7. The BDI agent checks whether the initial goal is achieved or not and decides
either: (1) to output the report which records the process of the whole PT, or (2) to
return to the new reasoning cycle. Some conditions are defined to stop the reasoning
cycle, for example, all plans have been executed or the running time reaches the
limit.
4.4 Simulation
The BDI simulation was implemented in Jason, working on a PC with an Intel
I7 CPU at 2.0 GHz and 4GB of RAM. In Figure 4.2, the simulation experiment
consisted of two agents representing the BDI agent and the target agent. In order to
simplify the process of PT in the virtual environment, the internal communication
actions in Jason such as send(tell) and send(ask) were used to simulate the attack
and probe actions between the BDI agent and the target agent. The print() was
used to output the process of interaction. The structure of the plan in the Jason
interpreter is shown below:
Trigger Event: Context <- Body.
This simulation was designed to validate the proposed BDI model in PT scenar-
ios and shows how beliefs can be changed according to environmental responses or
changes.
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Figure 4.1: The BDI agent reasoning cycle for PT
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Figure 4.2: The interaction between a BDI agent and a target agent
4.4.1 Target Agent
The basic information regarding the target was set up in the target agent’s initial
belief set, including system type, ports, services, vulnerabilities and the Secure Shell
(SSH) password (Table 4.1). To make the scenario uncertain, the success probability
of an SSH password attack was defined as 20%. The success probability of a remote
and local buffer overflow attack was defined as 50% and 70%, respectively, based
on personal PT experience. The original belief set of the target agent is shown in
Figure 4.3
OS Port Service vulnerability Password
Linux 80, 22,3306 Nginx, SSH, MySql CVE-remote, CVE-local SSH:456
Table 4.1: Target information
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Figure 4.3: Belief set in the target agent
Chapter 4. BDI Architecture for Penetration Testing 49
4.4.2 BDI Agent
For the BDI agent, the current privilege was initially set up as none, and the initial
goal was root privilege. Information-gathering plans were defined to probe OS type,
ports, service and vulnerability information from the target agent. The attack plans
were defined for password attack and buffer overflow attack. Validation actions such
as check remote() and check local() were defined to check the result of buffer overflow
attacks. Moreover, an stop() action was defined to avoid falling into an infinite loop.
The set of beliefs, desires and intentions for the simulation were defined as follows:
• Belief: ostype(string), port(string), service(string), vulnerability(string),
password ssh(string).
• Desire: probe os(), probe port(), probe service(), probe vul(), check remote(),
check local(), password attack ssh(), buffer overflow attack local(),
buffer overflow attack remote()
• Intentions: stop()
4.4.3 Simulation Results
Two simulations were conducted to show how the BDI agent interacts with the tar-
get agent in different circumstances.
1) Simulation 1
Figure 4.4 presents the result of simulation 1. From the figure, it can be seen
that the BDI agent probed all information about the target in the belief set and
successfully performed the password attack because the rate of the password attack
was over the specified 0.8 threshold. Then, the BDI agent performed a local buffer
overflow attack successfully; the prerequisite of a successful password attack was as-
sumed. However, the remote buffer overflow attack failed. The current privilege had
been changed from none to user and root. Three new beliefs, attacked(“cve local”),
password ssh(456) and privilege(root), were added to the belief set of the BDI agent,
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Figure 4.4: The result of simulation 1
Chapter 4. BDI Architecture for Penetration Testing 51
as shown in Figure 4.5.
2) Simulation 2
In simulation 2, the BDI agent probed all the information about the target. All
attacks failed, and the BDI agent was stopped. The belief set is shown in Figure 4.6.
From the figure, it can be seen that the current privileges were not changed in the
belief set of the BDI agent. Figure 4.7 shows the result of simulation 2, in which the
remote buffer overflow attack and SSH password attack failed.
4.5 Knowledge Base
A knowledge base can be used for decision making, which consists of all plans and
their preferences provided by human experts. An agent can have multiple plans
triggered by the same event and thus deal with this event in different ways. Hence,
an agent can have multiple different responses to events. If a plan fails to achieve a
goal, then the agent can select another plan from all candidate plans. By default,
the chosen plan is executed in its turn in a BDI interpreter. In the knowledge base,
the utilities are used to indicate an action’s priority based on expert experience,
so that the agent simply selects the plan that has the highest utility. In addition,
MITRE ATT&CK [98] is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics
and techniques based on real-world observations, which is an ideal framework to help
construct a BDI-based knowledge base. It has become a useful tool across many
cybersecurity disciplines to convey threat intelligence, perform PT, and improve
network and system defences against intrusions.
4.6 Reporting
The goal of PT is to find, exploit and determine the risk of system vulnerabili-
ties. The proposed BDI model can automatically generate a report, including target
information, implementation process, action set and result. In general, system in-
formation such as IP address, ports, configurations, services and vulnerabilities are
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Figure 4.5: Belief set of the BDI agent in simulation 1
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Figure 4.6: Belief set of the BDI agent in simulation 2
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Figure 4.7: The result of simulation 2
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stored in the belief set after the information-gathering stage to drive further actions.
Firstly, the BDI model can extract this information into a report file. Secondly, dur-
ing the automated PT, the BDI model can print each action performed to represent
the implementation process and action set. Finally, the results are stored in the
report to show the privilege has already been obtained. For future work, Natural
Language Processing (NLP) [48] technology can be used to generate more readable
PT reports.
4.7 Summary
This chapter presented an agent-based BDI model for the automation of PT, enabling
interactions between dynamic and uncertain targets. PT actions are defined as a
series of BDI plans, and the BDI reasoning cycle is used to represent the PT process.
To validate the BDI model, two simulations show the BDI agent behaviour and
reasoning process. A BDI-based knowledge base is used to determine how to act
during PT. Finally, the BDI model generates a PT report automatically.
Chapter 5
Ontology for BDI-based
Automation of Penetration Testing
5.1 Introduction
The BDI model can make decisions based on pre-defined plans and interact with
environments, while humans can obtain new knowledge from collected information
by reasoning. Generally, new beliefs need to be generated after performing actions
in the BDI model. This can be done using an ontology. Also, ontologies can achieve
the reusability of knowledge. This chapter presents an ontology for PT and how to
achieve its reasoning ability based on SWRL rules. By combining an ontology with
SWRL rules, the reasoning ability of BDI models can be improved in the automation
of PT.
5.2 Ontology Design
According to the attack taxonomy in chapter 2, an ontology is created for PT (On-
toPT) using Protege [75]. Figure 5.1 presents the OntoPT outline. Specifically, the
yellow dots represent classes, and purple diamonds represent instances. The arcs
indicate the relationship between instances or classes.
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Figure 5.1: Ontology for PT (OntoPT)
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In OntoPT, attacker, target, attack method and vulnerability classes are created
as top-level concepts. The attacker class includes a set of attacker instances, such as
attacker1. All the targets which have the root privilege belong to the attacker class.
The target class includes a set of target instances such as target 1 and target 2.
These target instances are described by data properties such as IP address, port, OS,
application, configuration and current permission. In this case, when two targets are
in the same subnet, this is indicated by a relation. Through ontology, it is easy to
understand the network topology of the target.
The vulnerability class includes a set of instances to represent vulnerability infor-
mation. The CVSS database can be used to establish the instances and the relation-
ships between the vulnerabilities through the pre-condition and post-condition of the
vulnerability. In OntoPT, the MS08-067 vulnerability instance has been included for
presentation purposes.
The attack method class consists of multiple levels of attack methods, based
on the PT taxonomy, such as buffer overflow attack or password attack. Within
the attack method class, specific attack actions are defined as instances which in-
clude data properties such as action, pre-condition and post-condition. If there is
a relation between an attacker instance and an action instance, that represent the
attacker performs the specific action. In OntoPT, one instance indicates performing
a buffer overflow attack with CVE number MS08-067. Property characteristics and
descriptions are used to represent axioms and restrictions in OntoPT. For example,
the object property isSameSubnet is symmetric. Moreover, all attack methods are
pre-defined and extensible in OntoPT.
To describe the relations between instances, five object properties are defined
below:
• hasPermission: represents an attacker who has specific current permission in
a target.
• isConnected: represents an attacker instance that can be connected to the
target instance.
Chapter 5. Ontology for BDI-based Automation of Penetration Testing 59
• isNotConnected represents an attacker instance that cannot be connected to
the target instance.
• isSameSubnet: represents an target instances which are in the same subnet.
• exploitBy: represents an attacker who can perform a specific attack.
• hasVul: represents an target that has specific vulnerability.
5.3 SWRL and Reasoning
SWRL is regarded not only as a combination of rules and ontologies but also as being
able to directly use the relationships and vocabulary in an ontology. SWRL rules
comprise a body and head, which represent pre-conditions and post-conditions. The
body and head consist of a set of atoms. Informally, a rule can be read as meaning
that if the body is true, then the head must also be true. SWRL rules are established
by using the attributes and relationships in the ontology.
SWRL rules are used to determine attack actions when certain pre-conditions
are satisfied as well as to obtain new knowledge. Therefore, the SWRL rule base is





→ exploitBy(attacker,MS08− 067 attack)
Rule 1 presents the process of an attack on vulnerability MS08-067: when the
attacker can connect to target 1, which has MS08-067 vulnerability, then the attacker
can perform an MS08-067 attack. After reasoning using the inference engine in
Protege, a new relation occurs between the attacker instance and the MS08-067
instance, represented by the object property exploitBy. Figure 5.2 shows how attacker
1 performs the MS08-067 attack.
60 Ge Chu
Figure 5.2: Example for Rule-1 SWRL rule-based reasoning
Unlike the BDI model, SWRL rules can be directly reasoned to obtain new knowl-
edge, while the BDI model needs to perform specific actions on the environment.
For example, ontology can discover potential attack paths through a combination of
SWRL rules, property characteristics and descriptions. Rule 2 presents a PT sce-
nario in an internal network, whereby, if the attacker can connect to target 2 and
successfully gain root permission, then target 2 becomes an internal attacker. In this
way, it is easy to ensure that the path reaches its final target. Figure 5.3 shows that






currentPermission(target2, root) → attacker(target2)
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Figure 5.3: Example for Rule-2 SWRL rule-based reasoning
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5.4 Automation
Based on an ontology and SWRL rules, the BDI agent framework achieves a better
performance in automated PT. In general, an ontology is used to store knowledge of
targets and attacks, while the BDI agent performs specific attack actions. Owlready
[58] is a module for ontology-oriented programming in Python which is used to
interact between the ontology and the BDI agent by performing actions such as
load, query, create, update classes, instances, properties and reasoning. In addition,
BDIPython is used to implement the BDI mechanism, which is a Python library
used to support BDI-style programming. The approach has two knowledge bases,
SWRL rules and BDI plans. The SWRL rules are used to make decisions about
an attack by inference using the ontology, while plans are used to perform multiple
attack steps in the BDI agent. In fact, the ontology is only updated with the result
of an attack rather than with the information generated by the intermediate process
of an attack. The advantage of using an SWRL-based ontology knowledge base is
that the agent can infer new knowledge rather than relying on pre-defined plans.
5.4.1 Interaction between a BDI Model and an Ontology
The interaction between a BDI agent and on ontology can be illustrated by the
pseudocode given in the algorithm 1. Firstly, the BDI model acts and returns the
result (lines 1 - 3). Secondly, the ontology instances and data properties are created
based on the result (lines 5 - 8). Finally, the BDI model can act if the ontology
instance has a specific data property in exploityBy relation (lines 10 - 14).
Algorithm 2 shows an example of the interaction between an agent and an on-
tology to perform the MS08-067 attack: Firstly, the BDI model collects the open
port information by running Nmap and returns the result (lines 1 - 3). Secondly,
the ontology instances and data properties are created based on the result (lines 5
- 8) and run a reasoning engine. Finally, the BDI model can perform an MS08-067
attack if the ontology instance has MS08-067 data property in exploityBy relation
(lines 10 - 14).
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The target information and PT knowledge can be stored using the ontology. The
target information is stored as instances under target classes with data properties
such as IP address, ports, OS, applications, configurations, vulnerabilities and cur-
rent permission. The object property isSameSubnet represents the relation between
targets. From the attacker’s perspective, attack actions are stored as instances un-
der the attacker methods class with data properties such as actions, pre-conditions
and post-conditions. SWRL rules are used to determine attack actions and their
preference according to target information, while also updating the information or
relations in the ontology. After the ontology determines the specific attack action,
the BDI plan can perform the attack. At this point, the belief set in the BDI agent
is used to store new information generated during the attack. Finally, the ontology
is updated, including the object property exploitBy and data property current prop-
erty, after the attack is finished in the BDI agent, using Owlready2. The process of
the ontology-based automation of PT is presented in Figure 5.4:
5.5 Attack Scenario
An attack scenario is used to validate the ontology-based method in a virtual en-
vironment. The demonstration runs on the Kali Linux virtual machine, while the
target runs on a Windows XP SP3 virtual machine. Metasploit, a popular PT frame-
work, is used for attack action space. In BDIPython, functions are used to define
attack actions and plan rules to achieve the BDI reasoning cycle. The demonstration
shows the process of attacking target 2. The target information is shown below:
- IP address: 192.168.1.162
- Ports: 135, 139, 445, 3389
- Operating system: Windows XP SP3
- Vulnerabilities: MS08-067, Weak password
- Current permission: None
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Figure 5.4: Process of automation of PT using an ontology
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The MS08-067 buffer overflow attack and SSH password attack are used to show
the process of attack, as shown in Figure 5.5. Firstly, after inputting the target 2
IP address and attacker’s IP address, the agent starts to probe the target 2 ’s port.
Then, according to the port scan results, there is no SSH port running on target
2. Thus, the agent performs the MS08-067 attack. Finally, the MS08-067 attack is
successful (see Figure 5.6), and the agent obtains the highest permission in the target
2 system. Figure 5.7 shows a connection has been created between the agent and
target machine with a system privilege through the 4444 port.
Figure 5.5: Probe target’s port
All the information about target 2 is stored in the data property. Figure 5.8
shows the updates of the data property in target 2 and the relation between attacker
instance and MS08-067 instance in the ontology. In target 2 data properties, current
permission is changed to system.
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Figure 5.6: MS08-067 attack
Figure 5.7: System permission
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Figure 5.8: Properties update in the ontology
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, an ontology-based automated PT approach was proposed. An ontol-
ogy was created by Protege based on PT attack taxonomy. To help make decisions
and generate new knowledge, SWRL rules were used to create an extra PT knowl-
edge base. To validate the approach, the BDIPython library was used to implement
an attack scenario in a virtual environment. By using an ontology, the BDI model
obtained better reasoning ability in the automation of PT.
Chapter 6
Penetration Testing for Internet of
Things and Its Automation
6.1 Introduction
The IoT was proposed by MIT in 1999; this particular period heralded a critical
episode in the new generation of information technology [21]. The IoT is considered
an extension of the traditional Internet, whereby things in the physical world can
be connected to the Internet. The IoT allows information communication transfer
along with recognition, location, tracking information, monitoring and management
based on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), sensor, GPS or machine to machine
technologies. According to the literature, the IoT structure consists of three layers:
application, network and perception [29]. The application layer provides various ser-
vices to users in different scenarios. The network layer is responsible for information
transmission and processing. Finally, the perception layer collects information and
identifies objects in the physical world, including various hardware terminals such as
RFID, sensor and GPS. Currently, IoT technology has been applied in various fields
such as smart grid, intelligent traffic, smart city, smart home, intelligent healthcare,
physical activity and smart building. However, due to a growing number of attacks,
a significant number of researchers have recently focused on security.
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Most IoT security research focuses on the analysis, defence or attack of a specific
device. To date, no approach has been devised to evaluate the overall security of
IoT from the perspective of an attacker. Although PT is a heavily favoured method,
the process incurs extensive financial costs and takes a significant amount of time.
Automation can significantly improve the efficiency of PT. This chapter analyses the
security problems of IoT and proposes a PT methodology and its automation based
on the BDI model to evaluate IoT security.
6.2 Security Issues in the Internet of Things
IoT security has specialised characteristics which the traditional Internet lacks, be-
cause its three-layered structure causes more vulnerabilities and attack surfaces.
Therefore, traditional network security solutions are not sufficient to protect the
IoT. In the three-layered IoT structure, each layer has specific security issues, some
of which are similar to the traditional network. This section analyses the security
issues in each layer.
6.2.1 Perception Layer Security
The perception layer, also known as a recognition layer or physical layer, collects
information from the real world and integrates it into the digital world by RFID,
sensors, GPS and other hardware devices. Normally, the nodes in the perception
layer are light, with low power, limited computing ability, low storage space, and they
remain unattended. Therefore, the traditional information security solutions are not
adopted in the perception layer. From perception network to nodes, specific security
issues cause more attack surfaces. For example, nodes are vulnerable to attack by
skimming, eavesdropping, spoofing, cloning, killing, jamming and shielding [81].
6.2.2 Network Layer Security
The network layer is responsible for the transmission of information between the
application layer and the perception layer. The network layer is a combination of
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various networks, including the Internet, mobile communication network, satellite,
GSM network, GPRS, 3G, 4G and WIFI network. The security issues of these
networks are similar to traditional ones, and they are vulnerable to DDoS attack,
sniffing attack, data tampering attack, data replay attack and signal interference
attack. In addition, the mix of different network architectures may cause new security
issues [81].
6.2.3 Application Layer Security
The application layer provides various services to users, such as smart grid, intelligent
traffic, smart city, smart home, intelligent healthcare and smart building. The IoT
can be accessed and managed by users through various applications in different
technological platforms such as computers, mobiles or smart hardware devices. The
main security risk of the application layer (as with the others) is its vulnerability
to attack depending on the IoT scenario (e.g, buffer overflow attack, SQL injection,
XSS, password attack and social engineering attack).
6.3 Penetration Testing for IoT
Research on IoT-specific security issues and the IoT attack surface areas project
by OWASP [67], has demonstrated that the perception layer is what distinguishes
traditional PT from the PT for IoT. The process of IoT PT be considered in terms
of four stages, as shown in Figure 6.1, namely, 1) information gathering, 2) analysis,
3) exploitation, and 4) reporting.
6.3.1 Information Gathering
The information gathering in the initial stage is a critical step that determines PT
success by probing information from all three IoT structural layers (perception, net-
work and application).
Chapter 6. Penetration Testing for Internet of Things and Its Automation 73
Figure 6.1: The process of IoT PT
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6.3.1.1 Perception Layer
In the perception layer, it is essential to collect information regarding the physical
environment, location of the node, type of node, range of the node, type of connec-
tion, type of communication protocol, topology of the node, type of node operation
system, power of the node, security mechanism, node vulnerability and transmission
protocol vulnerability. Examples of tools include, but are not limited to:
• Hardware Bridge API: an IoT PT extension in Metasploit.
• Nmap: a free and open source utility for network discovery and security au-
diting.
• OpenVAS: an advanced open source vulnerability scanner and management
system.
• Nessus: a globally used vulnerability scanner.
• Shodan: detects which of your devices are connected to the Internet, where
they are located, any vulnerabilities and who is using them.
6.3.1.2 Network Layer
The network layer is critical to collect information similar to traditional PT such
as network, type of connection, security mechanism, type of communication and
transmission protocol vulnerability by network attack tools, such as the well-known
wireless attack suite Aircrack-ng.
6.3.1.3 Application Layer
Information gathering in the application layer is similar to traditional PT. It is
vital to collect information regarding OS, port, services information, type of access
control, configuration information and vulnerability information by Nmap, OpenVAS
and Nessus.
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6.3.1.4 Social Engineering Information
To improve the probability of success in PT, social engineering information also
needs to be collected, for example, DNS information, the email list and application
information. The DNSenum and Fierce are famous for collecting DNS information,
and the email list can be collected by theHarvester.
6.3.2 Analysis
In the analysis stage, information regarding the target must be organised and anal-
ysed; subsequently, viable attack paths must be discerned and planned to obtain
access privilege to the target. Additionally, a validity check is often required and
performed within an experimental environment.
6.3.3 Exploitation
Real attacks are performed based on viable attack paths and planning in the analysis
stage. During PT, the DDoS attack is prohibited to ensure the availability of the
target.
6.3.3.1 Perception Layer
The IoT node characteristic in the perception layer determines the attack on this
layer and is the cause of the difference between traditional and IoT PT. Specific
attacks can be performed by Hardware Bridge API or IoTseeker, including [54]:
• Skimming: reading the node information illegally.
• Eavesdropping: sniffer information between nodes and router.
• Spoofing: generating fake node data.
• Cloning: cloning the node.
• Killing: stealing and destroying the node.
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• Buffer overflow attack on the node.
• Access control attack on the node: IoTseeker breaks the IoT device’s
default password.
6.3.3.2 Network Layer
Attacks on the network layer normally include: network traffic sniffer, signal replay,
signal fake and signal hijacking in different network communication protocols, such
as WIFI, 3G, 4G, GSM, Bluetooth by wireless attack Aircrack-ng. The description
of these attacks is as follows:
• Network traffic sniffer: sniffer information between networks.
• Signal replay: replaying the legal information to attack the target.
• Signal fake: generating legal information to attack the target.
• Signal hijacking: jamming the target network and forcing the target node to
connect to a controllable fake network.
6.3.3.3 Application Layer
The attack on the application layer is very similar to traditional PT, which consists
of web application attack, software buffer overflow attack and password attack by
using tools such as, but not limited to:
• Metasploit: The most critically acclaimed PT framework includes thousands
of exploitation loads.
• W3af: A web application attack framework.
• John the Ripper: A password cracker.
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6.3.3.4 Social Engineering Attack
Social engineering attack refers to a type of attack on the general publics lack of
security awareness. In a hypothetical example, employees can be targeted by de-
livering a malicious email to them, which enables machine access privilege to the
targets sub-network and further PT objectives. The ability to perform this type of
attack requires Setoolkit, the best-known tool within the field of PT, consisting of
social engineering attack tools.
6.3.4 Reporting
Successful PT results in identifying vulnerabilities, whose details are processed and
subsequently reported to the owner of the target as information to improve security.
6.4 Experiment
The model runs on a PC with an Intel I5 CPU at 2.3 GHz and 8GB of RAM. As shown
in Figure 6.2, the simulation experiment represents the BDI agent and the three
layers of IoT. The internal communication actions in Jason were used to simulate
the interaction between the BDI model and the IoT. The model is implemented by
AgentSpeak Jason.
6.4.1 IoT Target
The IoT targets information in three layers, including services and corresponding
vulnerabilities, as shown in Table 6.1, and this information is stored in the belief
set. Simulation of the three IoT structural layers required the creation of four agents
that represent the application and network layer and the two nodes in the perception
layer, respectively. Information can be transmitted between each layer and nodes,
and the network layer is responsible for the information transmission between the
application layer and the perception layer. Moreover, to make the scenario uncertain,
random numbers were used to determine the result of an attack.
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Figure 6.2: The interaction between a BDI agent and IoT
IoT Structure Service Vulnerability
Application layer Linux, App, Nginx, MySQL, port, SSH CVE-remote CVE-local, weak password:SSH:456
Network layer WiFi No encryption
Perception layer light, lightness sensor, ZigBee protocol No encryption, Replay attack
Table 6.1: IoT information
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6.4.2 BDI Agent
In BDI agents, the default privilege is none, and the initial goal is root privilege in
the application layer or control of the IoT. Plans are defined to probe information
and attacks on three layers agents based on the PT for IoT, described in the previous
section. For example, the BDI agent can probe OS type, port, service, vulnerability
information, network type and perform a password attack, sniffer attack, replay
attack and buffer overflow attack on three layers. The simulation experiment was
achieved by Jason’s internal actions, which are askAll and tell.
6.4.3 Simulation
A failed attack on the application layer was assumed. The attack on the network
and perception layer successfully showed the difference between the traditional and
current PT system for IoT. The basic information in the three layers was successfully
obtained, including OS type, ports, services, network type, network security and
vulnerabilities. The process of PT for IoT by the BDI agent can be observed in
Figure 6.3. Moreover, the BDI agent was successful in breaking the SSH password
and obtaining the users privilege. However, it failed to perform a local buffer overflow
attack to get root privilege. The BDI agent successfully performed a sniffer attack
due to the lack of security protection over each layer’s information transmission.
This resulted in the necessary information being gained regarding the light sensor
and light control instructions. Figure 6.4 shows the information collected by the BDI
agent that was stored in the belief set.
Figure 6.5 shows the process of information transmission in the network layer.
The command ’turn on the light’ and the light sensor information were transmitted
between the application and the network layer, which is exhibited in the belief set
of the network layer. Basic information and the value from the perception layer
are contained within the belief set of the application layer agent displayed in Figure
6.6. In the simulation, the value of the light sensor is 40. In the perception layer,
two agents represent light and light sensors. The BDI agent can perform the replay
attack according to the light sensor information and light control instructions, as
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Figure 6.3: The process of PT for IoT by BDI agent
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Figure 6.4: The belief set of BDI agent
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Figure 6.5: The belief set of network layer agent
shown by the belief set of node 1 and node 2 displayed in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8.
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Figure 6.6: The belief set of application layer agent
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Figure 6.7: The belief set of Node 1
Figure 6.8: The belief set of Node 2
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6.5 Summary
This chapter considered the IoT security features and proposed a PT methodology for
IoT. Its automation was achieved based on the BDI model. A simulated experiment




This chapter describes the performance of the BDI model in a real environment.
The BDI model was much faster than manual PT. In addition, the BDI model was
superior to the other approaches in regard to automation, real-time, uncertainty,
dynamic and scaling.
7.2 Experiments
For the performance analysis and evaluation, the proposed BDI model was tested in a
real environment. The experiment consisted of a Kali Linux machine as the attacker
agent and three target machines: Windows XP Service Pack 3, Windows 7 Service
Pack 1 and Metasploitable2 Linux. Metasploitable2 is a virtual machine based on
Ubuntu Linux that is designed to test common security vulnerabilities. For the ex-
periment, the BDI model was implemented using PROFETA [27], a Python tool for
programming autonomous systems using a declarative approach. PROFETA is a for-
mal language for creating BDI software agents, which is mainly used in autonomous
agents. One of the features of PROFETA is that it combines an object-oriented
paradigm and a declarative paradigm. A PROFETA program can be implemented
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Implementation of a PROFETA program
1: Import PROFETA libraries
2: Define beliefs, goals and sensors as classes
3: Define actions as classes and override the execute() methods
4: Define rules using declarative syntax
5: Instantiate the engine
6: Run the engine
Table 7.1: Implementation of a PROFETA program
[27]
Name Description
port(Belief) represents open port information
ostype(Belief) represents operating system information
privilege(Belief) represents privilege information
password(Belief) represents password information
vul(Belief) represents vulnerability information
application(Belief) represents application information
Table 7.2: Beliefs used in the experiment
using the steps shown in Table 7.1.
To ensure connectivity, all experimental machines were in the same local area
network. Figure 7.1 shows the network topology of the experiment. The target’s
response was saved in the form of a file. In other words, the attacker agent could
obtain the response of the target by reading the file. The beliefs were defined as
classes to represent the information, states or response from targets, or environment,
which trigger events to carry out actions. Table 7.2 shows the beliefs used in the
experiment, which are necessary for PT.
The action space was based on Metasploit since it provides a large number of
exploits and payloads for different operating systems. The attack actions and sensor
actions were defined as classes to carry out the port scan, OS identification, password
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Figure 7.1: Network topology
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Name Description
scanport(Action) Scan port, OS identification
check ms17010(Action) Determine if the vulnerability MS17010 exists
determine ms17010(Action) Obtain information from check MS17010 log file
ms17010 xp(Action) Attack Windows XP by MS17010 vulnerability
attack result ms17010 xp(Action) Determine the result of MS17010 attack on Windows XP
ms17010 win7(Action) Attack Windows 7 by MS17010 vulnerability
attack result ms17010 win7(Action) Determine the result of MS17010 attack on Windows 7
ssh password attack(Action) Crack SSH password
attack result ssh password attack(Action) Determine the result of SSH password attack
irc attack(Action) Attack by IRC vulnerability
attack result irc attack(Action) Determine the result of IRC attack
onto input(Action) Input information into an ontology
onto get(Action) Get information from an ontology
syncReasoner(Action) Run reasoning in an ontology
Table 7.3: The description of the attacker agent behaviour
attacks and buffer overflow attacks as well as to determine corresponding results. In
addition, two actions were used to exchange information between the BDI model and
ontology. The description of the attacker agent’s behaviour is shown in Table 7.3.
PROFETA uses declarative language to express the behaviour of agents as a set
of plans. The declarative syntax for the behaviour of an agent is described below:
Event/Condition / [setofActions]
The event can be a belief or a goal to trigger specific plans. The condition refers
to a set of pre-conditions, while the actions can be goals or a user-defined set of
actions. The goal was defined for the BDI agent to obtain root privilege of targets
or a set of plans to cover the whole PT process. The plans are shown below:
# Define r u l e s
+s t a r t ( ) >> [ s canport ( ) , onto input ( ) , syncReasoner ( ) ,
onto ge t ( ) ]
+port ( ”445” ) >> [ check ms17010 ( ) , determine ms17010 ( ) ]
+vul ( ”ms17010” ) / ostype ( ”windowsxp” ) >>[ms17010 xp ( ) ,
a t tack r e su l t ms17010 xp ( ) ]
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+vul ( ”ms17010” ) / ostype ( ”windows7” ) >>[ms17010 win7 ( ) ,
a t tack re su l t ms17010 win7 ( ) ]
+port ( ”22” ) >> [ s sh pas sword at tack ( ) ,
a t t a c k r e s u l t s s h p a s s w o r d a t t a c k ( ) ]
+port ( ”6667” ) >> [ i r c a t t a c k ( ) , a t t a c k r e s u l t i r c a t t a c k ( ) ]
+p r i v i l e g e ( ” root ” ) >> [ show l ine ( ”we got root ” ) ]
The proposed PT ontology was used to store targets or environmental informa-
tion, and relations between targets and vulnerabilities. The collected target infor-
mation was inserted into the ontology through onto input action. New knowledge
was obtained after SWRL-based reasoning and could determine the strategy of at-
tacks. SWRL rules are more suitable for expressing some common sense knowledge
of PT than the plans of the BDI model. Also, it is easier to express vulnerability
chains based on the relations between vulnerabilities. The new knowledge obtained
by SWRL-based reasoning was passed into the BDI model through the onto get ac-
tion to trigger new BDI rules. In the experiment, the characteristic of relations
isSameSubnet was defined as symmetric, so as to represent the common sense of
the subnet. Thus, it was easy to determine the connection relations between the
attacker and targets based on SWRL Rule 3. This new knowledge helped attackers
test more targets. For the experiment, Linux, Windows XP and Windows 7 were on
the same network. By default, the attacker agent could connect to one of the three
targets. Based on SWRL-based ontology inference, the new knowledge showed that
the attacker could connect to the other two targets. The relation update between
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Figure 7.2: The relation update between attacker 1 and target 2
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7.2.1 Attack on Linux
Figure 7.3 shows the information gathering from Metasploitable2 Linux. To simplify
the attack, only the ports 22, 445 and 6667 were inserted into the belief set after
the information-gathering action in the experiment. The attacker agent then tried
to carry out an SSH password attack, MS17-010 attack and IRC attack. The result
shows that only the IRC attack was successful and obtained the root privilege of the
target. The process of attacking Metasploitable2 Linux is shown in Figure 7.4.
7.2.2 Attack on Windows
The BDI model was able to attack Windows XP by using the MS17-010 vulnerability.
Firstly, it was able to learn from information-gathering actions that ports 135, 139
and 445 were open and that Windows XP ran on the target. To simplify the attack,
only the port 445 and operating system were inserted into the belief set. Then, the
model tried to determine whether MS17-010 vulnerability existed on the target and
performed the MS17-010 attack. The result shows that the attack was successful
and obtained the root privilege of the target. The process of attacking the Windows
XP machine is shown in Figure 7.5.
Similarly, the BDI model was able to attack Windows 7 by using the MS17-010
vulnerability. The process of attacking Windows 7 was similar to Windows XP, as
shown in Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.3: Experiment: Information gathering from Linux
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Figure 7.4: Experiment: The process of attacking Metasploitable2 linux
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Figure 7.5: Experiment: The process of attacking Windows XP
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Figure 7.6: Experiment: The process of attacking Windows 7
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7.3 Evaluation
A range of metrics was used to assess the performance of the proposed automated
PT system, such as problem size, number of hosts in exposure, genetic generation,
training epoch, network state, number of objectives, action model, AI engine, con-
nectivity and vulnerabilities [65]. However, it is impossible to completely compare
related studies because the test environments are different. A large number of stud-
ies [93, 86, 4, 94, 92, 34, 43] used their own test targets to assess the performance of
their proposed solutions. Also, it is difficult to know the details of the test targets
used in each solutions. For example, a proposed automated PT system can attack
some targets easily, but not others. This makes the performance relevant only to the
model proposed in the respective study as there is no standardised basis for testing.
The process of automatic PT is dynamic and uncertain, while the probability of
success depends on the model and knowledge base. After a belief triggers a plan, the
BDI model executes the plan sequentially. If it fails to execute one plan, it goes back
to the previous step to execute another one. The model stops if beliefs can trigger
no plans, or all plans have been executed but do not realise the initial goal. Human
experts can adjust the priority of the plans based on their experience to improve the
model’s efficiency.
To highlight the performance enhancement of the BDI model, an evaluation was
carried out to compare the time consumption between the BDI model and manual PT
using the same target and attack. Usually, the BDI model requires a few seconds to
perform an attack, while it takes a few minutes to execute an attack manually. In the
experiment to attack Metasploitable2 Linux, for example, a series of configurations
was required to carry out a buffer overflow attack, password attack and port scan,
in Metasploit, including attack payload, target IP address, port and attack type.
It usually takes a few minutes to complete each configuration manually. However,
since all actions are pre-defined, the BDI model only took a few seconds to perform
similar actions. Table 7.4 shows the time taken for each action by the BDI model
and PT to attack Metasploitable2 Linux.
Human experts need at least a few minutes or more to decide what action to per-
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Action BDI model Manual
Port scan 9 18
SSH password attack 22 109
IRC attack 21 52
Total 52 179
Table 7.4: Time-consumed by the BDI model and PT (Seconds)
form, while the BDI model completes the decision almost instantaneously. Therefore,
the BDI model is much faster than manually performing a similar PT task.
The BDI model can perform real-time automated PT in an uncertain, dynamic
environment. Chapter 3 mentioned the limitations of attack trees, attack graphs,
PDDL-based planning and POMDP in the automation of PT. In industry, Metas-
ploit supports automation using resource scripts [51]. These scripts contain a set of
console commands that are executed when the script load. However, this approach
only executes pre-defined commands in order and cannot deal with uncertainty and
dynamic scenarios. Table 7.5 shows the comparison of the BDI model with these
approaches.
Approaches Automation Real-time Uncertainty Dynamic Scaling
BDI model Yes Yes Yes Yes Good
Attack tree [90, 111, 77] No No No No Poor
Attack graph [5, 50, 2, 106, 28, 53] No No No No Poor
PDDL based planning [8, 35, 79, 86, 25] No No No No Good
POMDP [88, 57, 87] Yes Yes Yes Yes Poor
Metasploit Resource Scripts [51] Yes No No No Good
Table 7.5: Comparison between the BDI model with other approaches
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7.4 Summary
In this chapter, the proposed BDI-based automated PT model was tested in a real
environment. The BDI model was implemented using the PROFETA and SWRL
rule-based ontology, which performed automated PT on Linux, Windows XP and
Windows 7. It is difficult to completely compare related studies because the test en-
vironments were different, and there is no standardised basis for testing. This chap-
ter presented an evaluation to compare the time consumption of the BDI model and
manual PT. Also, it was possible to compare the BDI model with other approaches,
namely automation, real-time, uncertainty, dynamic and scaling. The result illus-
trated that the performance of the BDI model was much better than manual PT
and other approaches. It was also found that the proposed BDI model could per-
form more comprehensive and complex automated attacks on various targets by




This chapter concludes by summarising the research carried out and the main con-
tributions, as well as addresses some directions for future research.
8.2 Summary
This thesis has achieved real-time automation of PT by using the BDI model and
OntoPT. The BDI model can deal with problems such as interactivity, dynamic,
uncertainty and complexity in real-world scenarios. The ontology is designed for PT
based on SWRL rules for knowledge reuse and reasoning. Based on OntoPT, the
BDI model can identify relationships between the targets and the vulnerabilities and
enhance its reasoning ability. Moreover, this thesis has proposed a PT methodology
for IoT and its automation based on the BDI model to evaluate IoT security. The
results of a real experiment, including Windows XP, Windows 7 and Linux, illustrate
that the performance of the BDI model is better than the manual and existing ap-
proaches. The BDI model can achieve more comprehensive and complex automated
attacks on various targets by expanding the action space and plan.
100
Chapter 8. Conclusions 101
8.3 Main Findings
The main findings of this thesis are that real-time automation of PT can be achieved
by:
• Using the BDI model to deal with interactive, dynamic, uncertain and complex
real-world scenarios of PT.
• Using the BDI to model the state space, action space and execution in PT
activity.
• Creating an ontology with SWRL rules to improve the reasoning ability and
enable knowledge reusability within PT scenarios
• Analysing the characteristics of IoT security and using a BDI model to evaluate
its security.
8.4 Future Work
There are certain limitations to this study. The proposed BDI-based automated PT
model’s performance depends on whether the knowledge base and action space cover
enough scenarios, which could be time-consuming for human testers to construct
manually. It is also a significant challenge to transform human experience into a
knowledge base, because PT experience does not take the form of structured data.
The biggest difficulty with automated PT is that the action space and state space are
theoretically infinite. Reinforcement learning seems to be a potential solution that
can learn how to interact with the environment based on maximising the cumulative
rewards. By using artificial neural networks, reinforcement learning can deal with
large state space. Further research could also investigate the combination of human
knowledge, neural networks and reinforcement learning, which is a potential research
direction for automated PT.
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